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49f2277ea1 |
@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
|
||||
name: Reusable Docker Publish
|
||||
|
||||
# Multi-arch (v1.9.0+): builds a manifest list for `platforms` (amd64 + arm64 by default) with
|
||||
# `docker buildx`, so the same tag runs on x86 servers and on the arm64 Raspberry Pi nodes with no
|
||||
# per-host changes. The Trivy gate is preserved by building the native amd64 image first with
|
||||
# --load, scanning that locally, and only then building + pushing the multi-arch manifest (the
|
||||
# amd64 layers are reused from cache, so only arm64 is newly built).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Runner requirements (baked into the PipelineImage runner; the workflow also self-installs as a
|
||||
# fallback): the `docker buildx` plugin, and a build daemon that permits `--privileged` containers
|
||||
# so QEMU/binfmt can be registered for cross-building arm64 on an amd64 runner.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
workflow_call:
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
@@ -12,12 +22,26 @@ on:
|
||||
floating_tag:
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||||
type: string
|
||||
default: "edge"
|
||||
platforms:
|
||||
# target platforms for the manifest list. Override to a single platform (e.g.
|
||||
# "linux/amd64") for images that do not need to run on the arm64 nodes.
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
default: "linux/amd64,linux/arm64"
|
||||
run_image_scan:
|
||||
type: boolean
|
||||
default: true
|
||||
scan_severity:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
default: "HIGH,CRITICAL"
|
||||
use_private_index:
|
||||
# pass the private Gitea PyPI index into the build as a BuildKit secret, for images
|
||||
# whose Dockerfile installs the in-house BB* packages. The Dockerfile must consume it
|
||||
# via `RUN --mount=type=secret,id=pip_extra_index`, never as an ARG or ENV, so the
|
||||
# token is not baked into an image layer.
|
||||
# Gitea 1.27.x does not reliably propagate boolean inputs through
|
||||
# reusable workflows. Callers pass the literal string "true".
|
||||
type: string
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||||
default: "false"
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||||
secrets:
|
||||
REGISTRY_USERNAME: { required: true }
|
||||
REGISTRY_PASSWORD: { required: true }
|
||||
@@ -25,12 +49,24 @@ on:
|
||||
NTFY_TOPIC: { required: true }
|
||||
NTFY_TOKEN: { required: true }
|
||||
NTFY_SERVER: { required: true }
|
||||
PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL: { required: false }
|
||||
|
||||
# Pinned build tooling. Keep in sync with the ARGs in the PipelineImage Dockerfiles.
|
||||
# buildx: verify the binary against checksums.txt from the buildx GitHub release before bumping.
|
||||
# binfmt: pin by digest (tonistiigi/binfmt@sha256:...) for the strongest posture; the version tag
|
||||
# below is immutable enough for CI and avoids a Docker Hub token dance in the workflow.
|
||||
env:
|
||||
BUILDX_VERSION: "0.36.1"
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||||
BUILDX_SHA256: "48af8a397ebd60178778bf63611dbcebe5f5e7a9be90eb9147b24b9587455778"
|
||||
BINFMT_IMAGE: "tonistiigi/binfmt:qemu-v10.2.3"
|
||||
TRIVY_VERSION: "0.74.0"
|
||||
TRIVY_SHA256: "2ae6fe3ee734b7fdf11335663e18c75ea12dccc76062f09f164a3b0f8be4371a"
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
publish:
|
||||
runs-on: docker
|
||||
container:
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:dev-bda315b82bb23d83065b77d91fedf0e20d9accf1
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||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:1.1.0
|
||||
credentials:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
@@ -43,50 +79,89 @@ jobs:
|
||||
id: vars
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
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||||
SHA_SHORT="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
|
||||
FULL_IMAGE="${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}/${{ inputs.image_name }}"
|
||||
TAGS="-t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}"
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||||
|
||||
# the SHA tag is always built; it is also the target Trivy scans before any push
|
||||
PUSH_TAGS="-t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT} -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${{ inputs.floating_tag }}"
|
||||
|
||||
if echo "${{ gitea.ref }}" | grep -q '^refs/tags/v'; then
|
||||
VERSION="${{ gitea.ref_name }}"
|
||||
VERSION="${VERSION#v}"
|
||||
MAJOR="$(echo "$VERSION" | cut -d. -f1)"
|
||||
MINOR="$(echo "$VERSION" | cut -d. -f1,2)"
|
||||
TAGS="${TAGS} -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:latest -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${VERSION} -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${MINOR} -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${MAJOR}"
|
||||
PUSH_TAGS="${PUSH_TAGS} -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:latest -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${VERSION} -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${MINOR} -t ${FULL_IMAGE}:${MAJOR}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "docker_tags=${TAGS}" >> "$GITEA_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "scan_ref=${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}" >> "$GITEA_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "push_tags=${PUSH_TAGS}" >> "$GITEA_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "full_image=${FULL_IMAGE}" >> "$GITEA_OUTPUT"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Docker Login
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login "${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}" -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build image
|
||||
- name: Set up Docker Buildx and QEMU
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
env:
|
||||
PLATFORMS: ${{ inputs.platforms }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
SHA_SHORT="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
|
||||
FULL_IMAGE="${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}/${{ inputs.image_name }}"
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
docker build \
|
||||
-t "${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}" \
|
||||
${{ inputs.dockerfile_path }}
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||||
|
||||
# Floating tag points at the most recent build on any branch/tag, so
|
||||
# the nightly image-security scan always has a stable target even
|
||||
# before a release exists. ":latest" stays release-only (below).
|
||||
docker tag "${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}" "${FULL_IMAGE}:${{ inputs.floating_tag }}"
|
||||
|
||||
if echo "${{ gitea.ref }}" | grep -q '^refs/tags/v'; then
|
||||
VERSION="${{ gitea.ref_name }}"
|
||||
VERSION="${VERSION#v}"
|
||||
MAJOR="$(echo "$VERSION" | cut -d. -f1)"
|
||||
MINOR="$(echo "$VERSION" | cut -d. -f1,2)"
|
||||
|
||||
docker tag "${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}" "${FULL_IMAGE}:latest"
|
||||
docker tag "${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}" "${FULL_IMAGE}:${VERSION}"
|
||||
docker tag "${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}" "${FULL_IMAGE}:${MINOR}"
|
||||
docker tag "${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}" "${FULL_IMAGE}:${MAJOR}"
|
||||
# Ensure the buildx plugin. Baked into the runner image (PipelineImage); this fallback
|
||||
# covers older runners, mirroring the Trivy fallback below. Pinned + checksum-verified.
|
||||
if ! docker buildx version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "=== buildx not in runner image, installing v${BUILDX_VERSION} ==="
|
||||
mkdir -p /usr/libexec/docker/cli-plugins
|
||||
curl -sSfLo /usr/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/docker-buildx \
|
||||
"https://github.com/docker/buildx/releases/download/v${BUILDX_VERSION}/buildx-v${BUILDX_VERSION}.linux-amd64"
|
||||
echo "${BUILDX_SHA256} /usr/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/docker-buildx" | sha256sum -c -
|
||||
chmod +x /usr/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/docker-buildx
|
||||
fi
|
||||
docker buildx version
|
||||
|
||||
# Register QEMU so this amd64 runner can cross-build the non-native platforms. binfmt is
|
||||
# a kernel concern, so it cannot live in the runner image and is installed here against
|
||||
# the build daemon (needs --privileged).
|
||||
if echo "${PLATFORMS}" | grep -q 'arm'; then
|
||||
echo "=== Registering QEMU emulators (${BINFMT_IMAGE}) ==="
|
||||
docker run --privileged --rm "${BINFMT_IMAGE}" --install arm64
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# A docker-container builder is required for multi-platform output (the default docker
|
||||
# driver builds a single platform only). Idempotent across re-runs on a warm runner.
|
||||
docker buildx inspect multiarch >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
|
||||
docker buildx create --name multiarch --driver docker-container --bootstrap
|
||||
docker buildx use multiarch
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build image for vulnerability scan
|
||||
if: ${{ inputs.run_image_scan }}
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
env:
|
||||
PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL: ${{ secrets.PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET_ARGS=""
|
||||
if [ "${{ inputs.use_private_index }}" = "true" ]; then
|
||||
if [ -z "${PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL:-}" ]; then
|
||||
echo "use_private_index=true but the PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL secret is empty or not set"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
SECRET_ARGS="--secret id=pip_extra_index,env=PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# native amd64 only, loaded into the local image store so Trivy can scan it before
|
||||
# anything is pushed. The amd64 result is cached and reused by the multi-arch push.
|
||||
# CVEs live in the base image and OS/Python packages, which are identical across arches,
|
||||
# so scanning amd64 is a faithful gate for the whole manifest list.
|
||||
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker buildx build \
|
||||
--load \
|
||||
--platform linux/amd64 \
|
||||
${SECRET_ARGS} \
|
||||
-t "${{ steps.vars.outputs.scan_ref }}" \
|
||||
${{ inputs.dockerfile_path }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Image Vulnerability Scan
|
||||
if: ${{ inputs.run_image_scan }}
|
||||
@@ -98,8 +173,6 @@ jobs:
|
||||
# checksum, never "latest": Trivy releases were compromised in the
|
||||
# March 2026 supply-chain incident (malicious v0.69.4). Keep in sync
|
||||
# with the ARGs in the PipelineImage Dockerfiles.
|
||||
TRIVY_VERSION=0.71.0
|
||||
TRIVY_SHA256=30a3d22b23f88c233f1658f562fb477cae3b3e8b4761109d515b7698daf85814
|
||||
if ! command -v trivy >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "=== Trivy not in runner image, installing v${TRIVY_VERSION} ==="
|
||||
curl -sSfLO "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"
|
||||
@@ -109,74 +182,73 @@ jobs:
|
||||
fi
|
||||
trivy --version
|
||||
|
||||
SHA_SHORT="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
|
||||
FULL_IMAGE="${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}/${{ inputs.image_name }}"
|
||||
# Trivy's default vulnerability-DB source (mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-db) is a
|
||||
# Google-hosted cache of the upstream GHCR image, used to dodge GHCR's unauthenticated
|
||||
# rate limits. That cache occasionally 404s on a specific layer digest (a known,
|
||||
# recurring upstream issue: aquasecurity/trivy). Point at the canonical GHCR source
|
||||
# instead, and retry the DB download alone a few times — trivy exits 1 both for "DB
|
||||
# download failed" and for "vulnerabilities found", so the download is a separate step
|
||||
# from the scan to keep those two outcomes distinguishable.
|
||||
export TRIVY_DB_REPOSITORY="ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-db:2"
|
||||
export TRIVY_JAVA_DB_REPOSITORY="ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-java-db:1"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Scanning ${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT} (fail on fixable ${{ inputs.scan_severity }}) ==="
|
||||
echo "=== Ensuring vulnerability DB is up to date ==="
|
||||
db_attempt=1
|
||||
db_max_attempts=3
|
||||
until trivy image --download-db-only; do
|
||||
if [ "$db_attempt" -ge "$db_max_attempts" ]; then
|
||||
echo "=== Failed to download the Trivy vulnerability DB after ${db_max_attempts} attempts ==="
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "=== DB download failed, retrying (${db_attempt}/${db_max_attempts})... ==="
|
||||
db_attempt=$((db_attempt + 1))
|
||||
sleep $((db_attempt * 5))
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Scanning ${{ steps.vars.outputs.scan_ref }} (fail on fixable ${{ inputs.scan_severity }}) ==="
|
||||
trivy image \
|
||||
--exit-code 1 \
|
||||
--severity "${{ inputs.scan_severity }}" \
|
||||
--ignore-unfixed \
|
||||
--skip-db-update \
|
||||
--scanners vuln,secret \
|
||||
"${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}"
|
||||
"${{ steps.vars.outputs.scan_ref }}"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Push image
|
||||
- name: Build and push multi-arch image
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
env:
|
||||
PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL: ${{ secrets.PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euxo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Git / Ref Info ==="
|
||||
git rev-parse HEAD
|
||||
git rev-parse --short HEAD
|
||||
echo "gitea.ref=${{ gitea.ref }}"
|
||||
echo "gitea.ref_name=${{ gitea.ref_name }}"
|
||||
echo "platforms=${{ inputs.platforms }}"
|
||||
|
||||
SHA_SHORT="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
|
||||
FULL_IMAGE="${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}/${{ inputs.image_name }}"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Image Info ==="
|
||||
echo "FULL_IMAGE=${FULL_IMAGE}"
|
||||
echo "SHA_SHORT=${SHA_SHORT}"
|
||||
echo "Expected image: ${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Local Docker Images ==="
|
||||
docker images | grep "${{ inputs.image_name }}" || true
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Inspect Image ==="
|
||||
docker image inspect "${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}" >/dev/null
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Docker Auth Check ==="
|
||||
docker info
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Push SHA tag ==="
|
||||
docker push "${FULL_IMAGE}:${SHA_SHORT}"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Push floating tag (${{ inputs.floating_tag }}) ==="
|
||||
docker push "${FULL_IMAGE}:${{ inputs.floating_tag }}"
|
||||
|
||||
if echo "${{ gitea.ref }}" | grep -q '^refs/tags/v'; then
|
||||
echo "=== Version tag detected ==="
|
||||
|
||||
VERSION="${{ gitea.ref_name }}"
|
||||
VERSION="${VERSION#v}"
|
||||
MAJOR="$(echo "$VERSION" | cut -d. -f1)"
|
||||
MINOR="$(echo "$VERSION" | cut -d. -f1,2)"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "VERSION=${VERSION}"
|
||||
echo "MINOR=${MINOR}"
|
||||
echo "MAJOR=${MAJOR}"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Push latest ==="
|
||||
docker push "${FULL_IMAGE}:latest"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Push version ==="
|
||||
docker push "${FULL_IMAGE}:${VERSION}"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Push minor ==="
|
||||
docker push "${FULL_IMAGE}:${MINOR}"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Push major ==="
|
||||
docker push "${FULL_IMAGE}:${MAJOR}"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "=== No version tag detected, only SHA tag pushed ==="
|
||||
SECRET_ARGS=""
|
||||
if [ "${{ inputs.use_private_index }}" = "true" ]; then
|
||||
if [ -z "${PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL:-}" ]; then
|
||||
echo "use_private_index=true but the PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL secret is empty or not set"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
SECRET_ARGS="--secret id=pip_extra_index,env=PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# one build produces every platform and pushes a manifest list per tag. The Trivy gate
|
||||
# above already ran on the amd64 image these layers are reused from, so a scan failure
|
||||
# aborts the job before this step. On a version tag this also pushes latest/major/minor.
|
||||
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker buildx build \
|
||||
--push \
|
||||
--platform "${{ inputs.platforms }}" \
|
||||
${SECRET_ARGS} \
|
||||
${{ steps.vars.outputs.push_tags }} \
|
||||
${{ inputs.dockerfile_path }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Verify pushed manifest
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
# confirm the pushed tag really is a multi-arch manifest list
|
||||
docker buildx imagetools inspect "${{ steps.vars.outputs.scan_ref }}"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
scan:
|
||||
runs-on: docker
|
||||
container:
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:dev-bda315b82bb23d83065b77d91fedf0e20d9accf1
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:1.1.0
|
||||
credentials:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ jobs:
|
||||
# checksum, never "latest": Trivy releases were compromised in the
|
||||
# March 2026 supply-chain incident (malicious v0.69.4). Keep in sync
|
||||
# with the ARGs in the PipelineImage Dockerfiles.
|
||||
TRIVY_VERSION=0.71.0
|
||||
TRIVY_SHA256=30a3d22b23f88c233f1658f562fb477cae3b3e8b4761109d515b7698daf85814
|
||||
TRIVY_VERSION=0.74.0
|
||||
TRIVY_SHA256=2ae6fe3ee734b7fdf11335663e18c75ea12dccc76062f09f164a3b0f8be4371a
|
||||
if ! command -v trivy >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "=== Trivy not in runner image, installing v${TRIVY_VERSION} ==="
|
||||
curl -sSfLO "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"
|
||||
@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
FULL_IMAGE="${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}/${{ inputs.image_name }}:${{ inputs.image_tag }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Trivy's default vulnerability-DB source (mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-db) is a
|
||||
# Google-hosted cache of the upstream GHCR image, used to dodge GHCR's unauthenticated
|
||||
# rate limits. That cache occasionally 404s on a specific layer digest (a known,
|
||||
# recurring upstream issue: aquasecurity/trivy). Point at the canonical GHCR source
|
||||
# instead, and retry the DB download alone a few times — trivy exits 1 both for "DB
|
||||
# download failed" and for "vulnerabilities found", so the download is a separate step
|
||||
# from the scan to keep those two outcomes distinguishable.
|
||||
export TRIVY_DB_REPOSITORY="ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-db:2"
|
||||
export TRIVY_JAVA_DB_REPOSITORY="ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-java-db:1"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Ensuring vulnerability DB is up to date ==="
|
||||
db_attempt=1
|
||||
db_max_attempts=3
|
||||
until trivy image --download-db-only; do
|
||||
if [ "$db_attempt" -ge "$db_max_attempts" ]; then
|
||||
echo "=== Failed to download the Trivy vulnerability DB after ${db_max_attempts} attempts ==="
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "=== DB download failed, retrying (${db_attempt}/${db_max_attempts})... ==="
|
||||
db_attempt=$((db_attempt + 1))
|
||||
sleep $((db_attempt * 5))
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Scanning ${FULL_IMAGE} (fail on fixable ${{ inputs.scan_severity }}) ==="
|
||||
trivy image \
|
||||
--exit-code 1 \
|
||||
--severity "${{ inputs.scan_severity }}" \
|
||||
--ignore-unfixed \
|
||||
--skip-db-update \
|
||||
--scanners vuln,secret \
|
||||
"${FULL_IMAGE}"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,19 +40,27 @@ jobs:
|
||||
repo = "${{ gitea.repository }}"
|
||||
current_run_number = int("${{ gitea.run_number }}")
|
||||
current_branch = "${{ gitea.ref_name }}"
|
||||
# gitea.event_name is unreliable here: notifications.yml is itself called via
|
||||
# workflow_call from the caller workflow, so inside this job it reports
|
||||
# "workflow_call" rather than the top-level event (push/schedule/...) that
|
||||
# actually started the run. The Actions API reports the real triggering event
|
||||
# per run, so use that for the current run instead of trusting this context
|
||||
# value. It is kept only as a last-resort fallback if the current run can't be
|
||||
# found in the scanned history at all.
|
||||
current_event = "${{ gitea.event_name }}"
|
||||
token = os.environ["API_GITEA_TOKEN"]
|
||||
|
||||
url = (
|
||||
f"{server}/api/v1/repos/{repo}/actions/runs"
|
||||
f"?page=1&limit=5"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
print(f"Fetching workflow runs from: {url}")
|
||||
print(f"Current run number: {current_run_number}")
|
||||
print(f"Current branch: {current_branch}")
|
||||
print(f"Current event: {current_event}")
|
||||
print(f"Current event (context, may be inaccurate): {current_event}")
|
||||
previous = "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
# Scheduled runs can push the prior run for this branch/event beyond the
|
||||
# first page. Scan a bounded history so a succeeding push after a failure
|
||||
# is still reported as healed.
|
||||
for page in range(1, 11):
|
||||
url = f"{server}/api/v1/repos/{repo}/actions/runs?page={page}&limit=100"
|
||||
print(f"Fetching workflow runs page {page}: {url}")
|
||||
req = urllib.request.Request(
|
||||
url,
|
||||
headers={
|
||||
@@ -60,15 +68,16 @@ jobs:
|
||||
"Accept": "application/json",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as response:
|
||||
data = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
|
||||
|
||||
runs = data.get("workflow_runs", [])
|
||||
|
||||
print(f"Received {len(runs)} workflow runs")
|
||||
|
||||
previous = "unknown"
|
||||
if not isinstance(runs, list):
|
||||
print("Received an invalid workflow-runs payload; stopping lookup.")
|
||||
break
|
||||
print(f"Received {len(runs)} workflow runs on page {page}")
|
||||
if not runs:
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
for run in runs:
|
||||
run_number = run.get("run_number")
|
||||
@@ -85,9 +94,10 @@ jobs:
|
||||
f"event={event}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# aktuellen Run überspringen
|
||||
if int(run_number) == current_run_number:
|
||||
print(" -> skipping current run")
|
||||
# aktuellen Run überspringen, aber dessen echtes Trigger-Event merken
|
||||
if str(run_number) == str(current_run_number):
|
||||
current_event = event or current_event
|
||||
print(f" -> skipping current run (actual event={event})")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# nur abgeschlossene Runs
|
||||
@@ -106,10 +116,12 @@ jobs:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
previous = conclusion or "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
print(f" -> selected previous conclusion: {previous}")
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
if previous != "unknown" or len(runs) < 100:
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
print(f"Previous conclusion final: {previous}")
|
||||
|
||||
with open(os.environ["GITEA_OUTPUT"], "a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,14 +22,16 @@ on:
|
||||
type: boolean
|
||||
default: true
|
||||
use_private_index:
|
||||
type: boolean
|
||||
default: false
|
||||
# Gitea 1.27.x does not reliably propagate boolean inputs through
|
||||
# reusable workflows. Keep this a string until that regression is fixed.
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
default: "false"
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
check:
|
||||
runs-on: docker
|
||||
container:
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:dev-bda315b82bb23d83065b77d91fedf0e20d9accf1
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:1.1.0
|
||||
credentials:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
@@ -38,15 +40,69 @@ jobs:
|
||||
- name: Checkout
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Configure private package index
|
||||
if: ${{ inputs.use_private_index }}
|
||||
# Keep this step unconditional. A Gitea Actions update can otherwise silently
|
||||
# skip it when a boolean workflow_call input is not propagated as expected;
|
||||
# pip then misleadingly reports that the private package does not exist.
|
||||
- name: Configure and verify private package index
|
||||
env:
|
||||
PRIVATE_INDEX_ENABLED: ${{ inputs.use_private_index }}
|
||||
PRIVATE_INDEX_URL: ${{ secrets.PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
echo "Private package index requested: ${PRIVATE_INDEX_ENABLED:-<empty>}"
|
||||
if [ "${PRIVATE_INDEX_ENABLED}" != "true" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Private package index is not requested for this workflow call."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -z "$PRIVATE_INDEX_URL" ]; then
|
||||
echo "use_private_index=true but the PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL secret is empty or not set"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Probe the configured simple index before pip resolves dependencies. The
|
||||
# probe deliberately prints only scheme/host/path, never URL credentials.
|
||||
# NOTE: Gitea's PyPI package registry does not serve a browsable listing at
|
||||
# the bare /simple/ root (only /simple/<package>/ resolves per PEP 503), so a
|
||||
# 404 against the configured URL is expected there and is not itself a fault.
|
||||
# This probe therefore only fails hard on auth rejection (401/403) or an
|
||||
# unreachable/erroring host; a plain 404 is logged and deferred to pip's own
|
||||
# resolution, which is the real signal for whether the package is installable.
|
||||
python - "$PRIVATE_INDEX_URL" <<'PY'
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
|
||||
from urllib.parse import unquote, urlsplit, urlunsplit
|
||||
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
|
||||
|
||||
configured_url = sys.argv[1]
|
||||
parsed = urlsplit(configured_url)
|
||||
hostname = parsed.hostname or "<missing host>"
|
||||
port = f":{parsed.port}" if parsed.port else ""
|
||||
safe_url = urlunsplit((parsed.scheme, f"{hostname}{port}", parsed.path, parsed.query, ""))
|
||||
request = Request(safe_url, headers={"Accept": "application/vnd.pypi.simple.v1+json"})
|
||||
if parsed.username is not None:
|
||||
credentials = f"{unquote(parsed.username)}:{unquote(parsed.password or '')}".encode()
|
||||
request.add_header("Authorization", "Basic " + base64.b64encode(credentials).decode())
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response: # nosec B310 -- configured CI package index
|
||||
print(f"Private package-index probe: HTTP {response.status} at {safe_url}")
|
||||
except HTTPError as error:
|
||||
print(f"Private package-index probe: HTTP {error.code} at {safe_url}")
|
||||
if error.code in {401, 403}:
|
||||
print("Authentication was rejected by the private package index.")
|
||||
raise SystemExit(1)
|
||||
if error.code == 404:
|
||||
print(
|
||||
"Bare index root returned 404; Gitea's PyPI registry does not "
|
||||
"serve a listing at /simple/ (only /simple/<package>/ resolves "
|
||||
"per PEP 503). Treating this as expected and deferring to pip's "
|
||||
"own dependency resolution to confirm the index actually works."
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit(1)
|
||||
except URLError as error:
|
||||
print(f"Private package-index probe could not reach {safe_url}: {error.reason}")
|
||||
raise SystemExit(1)
|
||||
PY
|
||||
pip config --site set global.extra-index-url "$PRIVATE_INDEX_URL"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install Tools & Deps
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@ on:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
use_private_index:
|
||||
# build backends that need the in-house BB* packages to resolve build dependencies
|
||||
type: boolean
|
||||
default: false
|
||||
# Gitea 1.27.x does not reliably propagate boolean inputs through
|
||||
# reusable workflows. Callers pass the literal string "true".
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
default: "false"
|
||||
secrets:
|
||||
REGISTRY_USERNAME: { required: true }
|
||||
REGISTRY_PASSWORD: { required: true }
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
publish:
|
||||
runs-on: docker
|
||||
container:
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:dev-bda315b82bb23d83065b77d91fedf0e20d9accf1
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:1.1.0
|
||||
credentials:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
security:
|
||||
runs-on: docker
|
||||
container:
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:dev-bda315b82bb23d83065b77d91fedf0e20d9accf1
|
||||
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:1.1.0
|
||||
credentials:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user