Files
SharedWorkflows/.gitea/workflows/image-security-checks.yml
T

95 lines
3.9 KiB
YAML

name: Reusable Image Security Checks
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
image_name:
required: true
type: string
image_tag:
type: string
default: "edge"
scan_severity:
type: string
default: "HIGH,CRITICAL"
secrets:
REGISTRY_USERNAME: { required: true }
REGISTRY_PASSWORD: { required: true }
DOCKER_REGISTRY: { required: true }
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: docker
container:
image: gitea.tech-buddy.at/bitbuddydev/gitea_runner_python314:1.0.3
credentials:
username: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
steps:
- name: Docker Login
run: |
echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login "${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}" -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
- name: Pull Image
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
FULL_IMAGE="${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}/${{ inputs.image_name }}:${{ inputs.image_tag }}"
echo "=== Pulling ${FULL_IMAGE} ==="
docker pull "${FULL_IMAGE}"
- name: Image Vulnerability Scan
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Fallback for runner images without Trivy baked in. Pinned version +
# checksum, never "latest": Trivy releases were compromised in the
# March 2026 supply-chain incident (malicious v0.69.4). Keep in sync
# with the ARGs in the PipelineImage Dockerfiles.
TRIVY_VERSION=0.72.0
TRIVY_SHA256=bbb64b9695866ce4a7a8f5c9592002c5961cab378577fa3f8a040df362b9b2ea
if ! command -v trivy >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "=== Trivy not in runner image, installing v${TRIVY_VERSION} ==="
curl -sSfLO "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"
echo "${TRIVY_SHA256} trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c -
tar -xzf "trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz" -C /usr/local/bin trivy
rm "trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"
fi
trivy --version
FULL_IMAGE="${{ secrets.DOCKER_REGISTRY }}/${{ inputs.image_name }}:${{ inputs.image_tag }}"
# Trivy's default vulnerability-DB source (mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-db) is a
# Google-hosted cache of the upstream GHCR image, used to dodge GHCR's unauthenticated
# rate limits. That cache occasionally 404s on a specific layer digest (a known,
# recurring upstream issue: aquasecurity/trivy). Point at the canonical GHCR source
# instead, and retry the DB download alone a few times — trivy exits 1 both for "DB
# download failed" and for "vulnerabilities found", so the download is a separate step
# from the scan to keep those two outcomes distinguishable.
export TRIVY_DB_REPOSITORY="ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-db:2"
export TRIVY_JAVA_DB_REPOSITORY="ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-java-db:1"
echo "=== Ensuring vulnerability DB is up to date ==="
db_attempt=1
db_max_attempts=3
until trivy image --download-db-only; do
if [ "$db_attempt" -ge "$db_max_attempts" ]; then
echo "=== Failed to download the Trivy vulnerability DB after ${db_max_attempts} attempts ==="
exit 1
fi
echo "=== DB download failed, retrying (${db_attempt}/${db_max_attempts})... ==="
db_attempt=$((db_attempt + 1))
sleep $((db_attempt * 5))
done
echo "=== Scanning ${FULL_IMAGE} (fail on fixable ${{ inputs.scan_severity }}) ==="
trivy image \
--exit-code 1 \
--severity "${{ inputs.scan_severity }}" \
--ignore-unfixed \
--skip-db-update \
--scanners vuln,secret \
"${FULL_IMAGE}"